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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Inasmuch as the Utah Supreme Court has transferred this appeal, this Court
has original jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to section 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the
Utah Code.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred by concluding, either as a matter of law

or undisputed fact, that the insured's death was not accidental, as is required for
coverage under the insured's life insurance policy. (R. 69-72, 117-21, 129).
Inasmuch as summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, this issue is
reviewed by the appellate court for correctness. White v. Deseelhorst 879 P.2d
1371, 1374 (Utah 1994). Accordingly, the appellate court accords no deference to
the trial court's conclusion that the facts are not in dispute nor the court's legal
conclusions based on those facts. Travelers Ins. Co. v. KearL 896 P.2d 644, 646
(Utah App. 1995). In addition, the appellate court will view the properly
submitted evidence, and the facts and inferences thereby supported, in a light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. I d at 647.
2.

Whether the trial court erred by concluding that the language of the

"felony" exclusion contained in the insurance policy is clear and unambiguous and
capable of only one interpretation. (R. 27-28, 73-75, 108-16, 129-30). Whether
the terms of a contract are ambiguous is a question of law which the appellate

1

court reviews for correctness. Alf v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272,
1274 (Utah 1993); Wade v. StangL 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1994).
3.

Whether the trial court erred by failing to construe the ambiguous

insurance policy provisions in favor of coverage of the insured and to thus grant
summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff in this case. (R. 27-28, 73-75, 108-16,
129-30). This issue presents a question of law, dependent on the interpretation of
binding case law, which the appellate court reviews for correctness. State v.
Richardson. 843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah App. 1992). Moreover, a trial court's
determination of what legal principles to apply is reviewed for correctness. State
exrel.H.R.V.. 906 P.2d 913, 915 (Utah App. 1995).
4.

Whether the trial court erred by concluding, either as a matter of

undisputed fact or of law, that the insured's death arose from the insured's
committing an assault or felony such that the "felony" exclusion in the insurance
policy applied. (R. 20-26, 76-78). Inasmuch as summary judgment is granted as a
matter of law, this issue is reviewed by the appellate court for correctness. White
v. Deseelhorst 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case: This case involves a dispute between Marilyn

Murdock, the beneficiary of a life insurance policy that provides accidental death
benefits, and Monumental Life Insurance Company. Mrs. Murdock's husband, the
insured, was killed when he was inadvertently run over by a van as he fled the

scene of a robbery, in which he participated. The insurance company refuses to
pay the $100,000 accidental death benefit, claiming that the insured's death was
not accidental and was attributable to the insured's commission of an assault or
felony, and is thus excluded from coverage under the policy.
II.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court:

Mrs.

Murdock commenced an action against Monumental Life Insurance Company by
filing a Complaint on February 10, 1998, alleging breach of contract, among other
things. (R. 1). The insurance company filed an Answer on March 27, 1998,
alleging that the death was not accidental and that any coverage could be legally
denied pursuant to the aforementioned "felony" exclusion. (R. 9). Both parties
moved for summary judgment, with Mrs. Murdock filing her motion on May 21,
1998, and with the insurance company filing its motion on June 12, 1998. (R. 16,
93). A hearing was held on the motions before Judge McCleve on July 17, 1999.
(R. 160). Judge McCleve ultimately denied Mrs. Murdock's motion for summary
judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company. A
Memorandum Decision was issued on August 4, 1998, and the Order was entered
on August 18, 1998. (R. 137, 141). Copies of the Memorandum Decision and the
Order are attached as Exhibit "A" of the Addendum to this Brief. This appeal
ensued.
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

On or about April 23, 1996, Zachary Murdock, participated in the

robbery of two employees of a local movie theater as they attempted to make a late
night deposit at a local bank. (R. 10, 67-68).
2.

Upon completing the robbery, Mr. Murdock and an unknown

accomplice fled the scene of the crime by running away on foot. (R. 10, 19, 68).
3.

Mr. Murdock and the accomplice fled the immediate vicinity of the

bank and ran into a field full of construction debris. (R. 68).
4.

Once the two men had fled, the victims were no longer being

attacked or threatened, but one of the victims, Richard Moser, subsequently got
into* a van arid chased after Mr. Murdock and his accomplice in order to try to get
the money back. (R. 91).
5.

Mr. Moser ultimately drove the vehicle over two cement dividers,

through a parking lot, and into the field full of construction debris. (R. 19, 68).
6.

Approximately three hundred feet from the crime scene, the vehicle

struck Mr. Murdock, causing his death. (R. 2, 10, 68, & R. 160, T. 25, 41).
7.

Mr. Moser maintains that he did not intend to collide with Mr.

Murdock. (R. 19, 38-52, 68, R. 160, T. 27).
8.

The unknown accomplice escaped with the money. (R. 68, 91).

9.

At the time of his death, Mr. Murdochs life was insured under two

accidental life insurance policies with Monumental Life Insurance Company. (R.
66).
10.

Mrs. Murdock, the decedent's wife, was named as the beneficiary of

the policies purchased by Mr. Murdock. (R. 2, 10, 19).
11.

Mrs. Murdock attempted to make a claim on the aforementioned life

insurance policy as a result of the accidental death of her husband. (R. 2, 10).
12.

The insurance company subsequently denied the claim and refused to

pay the benefits, relying upon its assertion that Mr. Murdock's death was not
accidental, and further relying upon an exclusion contained in the policy that
purports to deny coverage if the death was caused by, resulted from, or contributed
to by "committing an assault or felony." (R. 2, 10).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Mr. Murdock's death was accidental inasmuch as it was not the natural and
probable consequence of his prior actions. It does not "ordinarily" follow under
these circumstances that the victim would pursue Mr. Murdock and run him down
in a vehicle; thus, Mr. Murdock's death was not a "natural" consequence of his
prior actions. More importantly, the events were certainly not the "probable"
consequence of Mr. Murdock's actions-more likely to happen than to not happen.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mrs. Murdock, the trial court erred
in concluding that Mr. Murdock's death was not an accident.
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Mr. Murdock's death did not arise out of any assault or felony such that
Monumental^ "felony" exclusion applied to deny coverage. Exclusions must be
strictly construed against the insurer. Moreover, there must be a sufficient causal
link between any assault or felony and the death, including a sufficient relation in
time and place, for the exclusion to apply. Because Mr. Murdock had already fled
the crime scene, had already completed any assault or felony, and had already
withdrawn any felonious intent by the time he was killed, there was no adequate
causal relationship between the death and any assault or felony. In addition, the
auto-pedestrian collision could be seen as an intervening and superseding cause,
such as to eliminate the causation link. Furthermore, narrow construction of the
exclusion leads to the conclusion that Mr. Murdock was not "committing" an
assault or felony when his death occurred; thus, the exclusion should not apply.
Finally, whether Mr. Murdock's death falls within the exclusion is a fact-sensitive
question, inappropriate for determination on summary judgment. Indeed, when
viewing the facts and inferences in a light most favorable to Mrs. Murdock's
position, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.
Finally, the language of the "felony" exclusion in the insurance policy is
ambiguous. It is uncertain whether the exclusion refers to the insured's own acts or
to those of another person or both. In addition, the uncertainty is not resolved by
viewing all the listed exclusions as a whole. Ambiguities and uncertainties in an
insurance contract must be construed against the insurance company and in favor

of coverage whenever possible, regardless of what the most logical construction
would be. Accordingly, the trial court erred in determining that the "felony"
exclusion was plain and unambiguous in this case.
ARGUMENT
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Monumental Life
Insurance Company (hereinafter "Monumental"), concluding, as a matter of law,
that Mr. Murdock's death arose out of his felonious conduct, that his death was not
accidental, and that the death benefit is excluded by the plain meaning of the
parties' insurance contract.
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material
fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Glover
v. Boy Scouts of Am.. 923 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1996); see also Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c). Inasmuch as summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, the trial
court's ruling is reviewed for correctness. White v. Deseelhorst 879 P.2d 1371,
1374 (Utah 1994). Accordingly, the appellate court accords no deference to the
trial court's conclusion that the facts are not in dispute, nor the court's legal
conclusions based on those facts. Travelers Ins. Co. v. KearL 896 P.2d 644, 646
(Utah App. 1995). Finally, all
[d]oubts, uncertainties or inferences concerning issues of fact must
be construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment. Litigants must be able to present their cases fully to the
court before judgment can be rendered against them unless it is
obvious .. . that the party opposing judgment can establish no right
to recovery.
7

Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin. Wright & Miles. 681 P.2d 1258, 1261
(Utah 1984).
I. The Trial Court Erred by Concluding that
Mr. Murdockfs Death was not Accidental,
The parties' insurance contract provided for the payment of an accidental
death benefit for situations in which Mdeath occurs as a direct result of an injury"
and "within 365 days" of the occurrence of the event causing the "injury".
Moreover, the term "injury" is defined in the policy as "bodily injury caused by an
accident." A copy of the policy is attached as Exhibit "B" in the Addendum to this
Brief.
Mrs. Murdock has the burden to establish that her husband died within the
aforementioned parameters giving rise to coverage under the policy. Se generally
Quaker State Mini-Lube. Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.. 868 F.Supp. 1278 (D.
Utah 1994). The trial concluded that, as a matter of law, Mr. Murdock's death was
not accidental. By so concluding, the trial court removed the insured from the
scope of coverage of the accidental death policy.
Nevertheless, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mrs.
Murdock, and when applying the proper legal principles to those facts, the trial
court erred by reaching the conclusion it did.
The term "accident" is not expressly defined in the policy. However, Utah
courts have adequately set forth the standard to apply when determining if an event
should be considered an "accident" or "accidental" for purposes of an accidental

death policy. In 1921, the Utah Supreme Court first indicated that "accident" and
"accidental" are:
descriptive of means which produce effects which are not their
natural and probable consequences . . . . An effect which is the
natural and probable consequence of an act or course of action is not
an accident, nor is it produced by accidental means. It is either the
result of actual design, or it falls under the maxim that every man
must be held to intend the natural and probable consequences of his
deeds.
Richards v. Standard Accident Ins. Co.. 200 P. 1017, 1023 (Utah 1921). That
court further declared that:
[t]he natural consequences of means used [is] the consequence
which ordinarily follows from their use—the result which may be
reasonably anticipated from their use, and which ought to be
expected. The probable consequence of the use of given means is
the consequence which is more likely to follow from their use than it
is to fail to follow.
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Indeed, Utah courts still follow these same guidelines when determining
whether death resulted from an accident for purposes of insurance coverage. See
Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am.. 669 P.2d 410, 415-16 (Utah 1983). In
Hoffman, the court further clarified that "a person is a victim of an accident when,
from the victim's point of view, the occurrence causing the injury or death is not a
natural and probable result of the victim's own acts." I d at 416 (emphasis in
original).
Moreover, "the test is not whether the result was foreseeable, but whether it
was expected... . [Sjince the common meaning of the term ["accident"] is
Q

defined in terms of whether the event was naturally and probably expected or
anticipated by the insured, it is that definition which must be applied, and not one
founded on foreseeability." Id.
While it may have been "foreseeable" that one of Mr. Murdock's robbery
victims, though not the owner of the stolen property and no longer in immediate
danger, might give pursuit in a vehicle, might drive over cement barriers and into a
field full of construction debris, and might unintentionally collide with Mr.
Murdock, causing his death, such a sequence of events certainly could not be
viewed to be the "natural and probable consequence" of the completed robbery.
This especially so if the events are analyzed from Mr. Murdock's point of view, as
Hoffman mandates, and if the facts are viewed in a light most favorable to
concluding the death was accidental, as determination of a summary judgment
motion would mandate.
It does not "ordinarily" follow under these circumstances that the victim
would pursue Mr. Murdock and run him down in a vehicle; thus, Mr. Murdockfs
death was not a "natural" consequence of his prior actions. More importantly, the
events were certainly not the "probable" consequence of Mr. Murdock's actionsmore likely to happen than to not happen. The result would seem even less
probable in light of the fact that Mr. Moser did not intend to run down Mr.
Murdock with the van.

Applying these established rules, the Utah Supreme Court has previously
held that two juvenile boys, intentionally fleeing from a law enforcement officer in
a stolen vehicle at speeds exceeding eighty miles per hour, could not reasonably
have anticipated that death or injury was likely to result from a high-speed chase.
Sanders v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.. 138 P.2d 239, 242 (Utah 1943).
It is clearly more likely that death or injury would result under the
circumstances occurring in Sanders than under the circumstances involving Mr.
Murdock. Even so, the Sanders court concluded that the boys' death was
accidental. The trial court in our case even indicated that she even considered that
the events "might be foreseeable, but not likely." (R. 160, T. 29). Accordingly,
the trial court erred by concluding that Mr. Murdock's death was not accidental.
II. The Trial Court Erred by Concluding that
Mr. Murdock's Death Arose out of Felonious Conduct.
The parties' life insurance policy in this case also contains a list of
exclusions from coverage. More specifically, the insurance contract provides that
"We will not pay a benefit for a loss which is caused by, results from, or
contributed to by . .. committing an assault or felony." It is Mrs. Murdock's
contention that this exclusion is ambiguous because it is unclear whose conduct it
refers to. In any event, assuming, arguendo, that the exclusion language can only
be referring to Mr. Murdock's "committing an assault or felony," the trial court
erred by concluding, as a matter of law, that his death in fact arose from his
committing an assault or felony, and that any death benefit was therefore excluded.
11

Utah law makes it clear that the insurer has the burden to prove that an
exclusion to coverage applies such that the insurer can escape liability. Browning
v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. 80 P.2d 348, 350-51 (Utah 1938). Moreover,
Utah courts apply the basic principle that "exclusionary clauses are to be strictly
construed against the insurer. It must not be forgotten that the purpose of
insurance is to insure, and that construction should be taken which will render the
contract operative, rather than inoperative/' LPS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co.,
765 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1988) (quoting Phil Schroeder. Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins.
Co.. 659 P.2d 509, 511 (Wash. 1983) (further indicating that M[e]xclusion clauses
are strictly construed against the insurer, especially if they are of uncertain import.
An insurer may, of course, cut off liability under its policy with a clear language,
but it cannot do so with that dulled by ambiguity.")).
In LPS Hospital the court was construing an accident policy exclusion that
indicated that benefits would not be paid in cases "arising out of an attempt at
assault or felony." Id at 858. The Utah Supreme Court chose to adopt the
position that the insurer had to first establish a "causal relationship" between the
insured's injuries and the felony violation, relying on a Colorado case for the
principle that "in order to relieve the insurer of liability in such situations, the
insured must have been actually engaged in a felony at the time and place of the
injury." Id at 860.

The court in LPS Hospital then proceeded to analyze the facts of that case,
and concluded that the felony "was merely incidental to" the insured's injuries and
that the insurer improperly denied coverage. Id The court so concluded because
the insured's conduct in driving while legally intoxicated and colliding head-on
with another vehicle did not technically become felonious until the person with
whom the insured collided died five minutes later. IdL Accordingly, despite the
fact that the events giving rise to the felony of manslaughter, to which the insured
later pleaded guilty, had already been set in irreversible motion at the time the
insured was injured in the collision, the insured's injuries were not sufficiently
caused by the felony. I d at 858, 860.
Applying the same principles of strict construction and burden of proof to
this case, the trial court should not have concluded, as a matter of law, that Mr.
Murdock's death had a sufficient causal link with the commission of any assault or
felony to allow Monumental to avoid paying the benefits for which Mr. Murdock
contracted.
Any crime committed by Mr. Murdock was completed by the time he fled
the bank area. The defining elements of any felony or assault that could have
occurred do not include "running away," as was occurring in this case when Mr.
Murdock was inadvertantly killed by Mr. Moser. If Mr. Murdock had committed
an assault or felony, he was already guilty of the assault or felony whether he ran
away or not, and whether he actually escaped or not. Accordingly, Mr. Murdock's

fleeing a crime scene and being accidently run over, were not sufficiently
connected to the "time and place" of crime to establish the necessary causal link
any more than the events in LPS Hospital were tied to the time and place of the
felony committed by the insured in that case.
Indeed, other courts have required a legally proximate causal connection
between the allegedly excluded conduct and the injury received. Where the life
policy contained an exclusion for death resulting from a violation of the law, an
Indiana court held that "[n]ot only must there be a causative connection between
the violation of law and the death, but such connection must be direct and not
indirect: proximate or immediate, and not remote." Ben Hur Life Ass'n v. Cox.
181 N.E. 528, 531 (Ind. App. 1932). The auto-pedestrian collision that caused Mr.
Murdochs death could easily be considered an intervening and superseding cause
to break the chain of proximate causation.
Of more significance to our case, when the insured was killed when his own
gun discharged in a scuffle with a person whose home the insured had just
burglarized and from whom the insured was trying to escape, the Arizona Supreme
Court held that "[t]he cause of his injury was not the burglary, but the accidental
discharge of the weapon after the commission of the crime. Where one is killed
while attempting to escape or to avoid arrest after the commission of the crime it is
not within the [felony] exception." Jordan v. Logia Suprema de la Alianza
Hispano-Americana. 206 P. 162, 164 (Ariz. 1922) (emphasis added).

Moreover, cases in other jurisdictions have held that if the insured is no
longer engaged in the excluded event at the time of his death, then the exclusion
no longer applies, even if the chain of events may have included, and to an extent
precipitated by, the conduct of the insured intended to be excluded under the
policy. For example, in Denies v. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co.. 144 So. 2d 570 (La.
App. 1962), the life insurance policy included an exclusion in the case where death
occurred "while fighting . . . or violating the law." Li at 572. The insured in that
case had provoked a bar fight, but had been persuaded to leave the bar and had
reached his vehicle when the person with whom he had been fighting inside
approached the insured and the two engaged in fighting again, during which time
another individual shot and killed the insured. IdL at 571-73. The court concluded
that the exclusion should not apply because the insured had "withdrawn from the
affray" and was no longer "the aggressor" when he was shot. Id at 573. The
court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the insured was fighting at the
time of his death, and even though it would not seem unreasonable that the person
with whom he had initiated the fighting inside the bar might come after him
outside the bar.
The evidence in our case would support an inference that Mr. Murdock,
similarly, had withdrawn any felonious intent at the time he was running away.
The trial court in our case seemed to be of the opinion that "[f]leeing is not
withdrawing felonious intent." (R. 160, T. 18). Nevertheless, what more could

Mr. Murdock do to withdraw such intent? If a vehicle was fast approaching from
behind, it would not be logical to simply stop in place. Death or serious injury
would become even more possible by doing so. In addition, the accomplice
escaped with the stolen money. No evidence has ever indicated that Mr. Murdock
was carrying the money bag, which he could then have dropped to evidence his
present intent.
Clearly Mr. Murdock's actual intent at the time of his death, like that of the
insured in Denies, should be extremely relevant to determine whether or not he
was committing an assault or felony at the time. Viewing the facts and inferences
in a light most favorable to Mrs. Murdock, the trial court should have at least
concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to Mr.
Murdock's intention at the time of his death.
Admittedly, Monumental's language is broad, but it still must be construed
strictly and, if possible, in favor of coverage. The LPS Hospital court also relied
heavily on the policy's use of the term "attempt" in the exclusion. 765 P.2d at 86061. In our case, Monumental's policy employs the term "committing" with
reference to an assault an felony. The rule of strict and narrow construction
dictates that Monumental's felony exclusion should only apply if it arises in
connection with the "committing" of an assault or felony, stated in the present
tense, and not if it arises after the assault or felony has already been committed, as

would apply to Mr. Murdock's situation. LPS Hospital would seem to compel
such a conclusion.
Indeed, a broad reading of Monumental^ felony exclusion could result in a
near limitless exclusion. If the insured is a convicted felon and is incarcerated and
dies in an accidental fire while doing nothing wrong at the time, Monumental
could still make a claim that the insured's death was "contributed to" by the felony.
Such a result, however, would defeat the purpose of procuring insurance, and
would not be upheld by Utah courts.
Accordingly, the trial court erred by concluding that Monumental had met
its burden of proof and that itfs felony exclusion applied, as a matter of law, to
exclude coverage of Mr. Murdock under the facts of this case. In any event,
whether or not Mr. Murdock's death was sufficiently connected to the committing
of an assault or felony is a very fact-sensitive question. "Fact sensitive cases such
as this do not lend themselves to a determination on summary judgment." Praper
City v. Estate of Bernardo. 888 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1995) (being cited for the
general proposition stated). The question should have been put to the jury.
III. The Trial Court Erred by Concluding that Monumental's
Felony Exclusion was Not Ambiguous and by thus Failing
to Construe the Exclusion in Favor of Coverage.
Utah courts do not favor insurance policy exclusions because they render
the insurance contract inoperative rather than operative. See LPS Hosp. v. Capitol
Life Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 857, 858-59 (Utah 1988). This is why exclusions are to be

construed strictly against the insurer. IdL Moreover, the law is clear in Utah that
"any ambiguity or uncertainty in the language of an insurance contract must be
resolved in favor of coverage." IcL at 858 (indicating as well that "since the policy
is drawn by the insurer, ambiguities are construed against that party").
An insurer, of course, has an incentive to draft broad, vague, and uncertain
exclusions so as to try to exclude coverage under the most possible interpretations,
Accordingly, Utah courts follow the rule that "[a]n insurer may, of course, cut off
liability under its policy with a clear language, but it cannot do so with that dulled
by ambiguity." I d at 859.
The exclusion in this case simply states that Monumental "will not pay a
benefit for a loss which is caused by, results from, or contributed to by . . .
committing an assault or felony." The exclusion does not identify whether it is
referring to the committing of an assault or felony by the insured or by a third
party.
Utah courts will generally evaluate whether the insurance contract language
would "be plain to a person of ordinary intelligence and understanding, viewing
the matter fairly and reasonably, in accordance with the usual and natural meaning
of the words, and in light of the existing circumstances, including the purpose of
the policy." LI In other words, an ordinary insured, or purchaser of the policy,
must plainly understand what is being excluded. Moreover, the "contract language
may be ambiguous if it is unclear, omits terms, or if the terms used to express the

intention of the parties may be understood to have two or more plausible
meanings." Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross. 849 P.2d 1187, 1192
(UtahApp. 1993).
The ordinary insured would not know whether this exclusion is referring to
his or her own conduct or to the conduct of some third person which may directly
or indirectly result in the insured's death. Rest assured that the insurance company
would like to claim exclusion from coverage under any and all scenarios. The trial
court apparently accepted this all-inclusive interpretation, indicating that the
exclusion language in question "means anybody can commit an assault or felony
and they won't pay on the insured's case." (R. 160, T. 9).
The confusion is amplified by the fact that the exclusions are not all drafted
in parallel fashion, and some clearly refer to the insured and others clearly to third
parties. For example, the policy excludes "a loss which is caused by . . . suicide."
Obviously this exclusion refers to the insured's suicide. However, the policy also
refers to "a loss which is caused by . . . declared or undeclared war or any act of
war." In all likelihood, the insured will not be waging war; thus, this exclusion
refers to acts of third persons. Others are simply unclear, including the exclusions
for losses resulting from "alcohol intoxication," "full-time military service,"
"taking any drug," or "committing an assault or felony."
To an extent, the trial court recognized the ambiguity but simply ignored it.
The court expressed her view that the exclusion "could be argued to be ambiguous

because I don't know to whom they are referring/' but later declared that "I can't
imagine that there is any way to totally unambiguously without any vagueness
communicate in plain English totally perfectly." (R. 160, T. 12, 14).
Of course, any confusion could have been resolved by inserting the words
"by the insured" or "by a third party" or a combination of the two. Nevertheless, it
does not contain such language. When faced with a similar claim of uncertainty as
to whose conduct is being referred, one old court held the view that the rule that
"ambiguous terms . . . are construed most strongly against the insurer" did not
apply "for the reason that the language employed expresses clearly an exemption
from the risk of injuries inflicted intentionally by another as well as by the
insured." Orr v. Travelers' Ins. Co.. 24 So. 997, 998 (Ala. 1899). The implication
of the holding was that the exclusion would have been considered ambiguous if it
was not clear whether it referred to acts of the insured or another party.
Moreover, insurance companies have attempted to construe such vague
exclusions to refer to the acts of third persons, in addition to the acts of the
insured. For example, in Housh v. Pacific States Life Ins. Co.. 37 P.2d 741 (Cal.
1934), the accidental death policy provided that it did "not cover any loss resulting
from . . . suicide, sane or insane, or any attempt thereat, or intentionally inflicted
injuries." Li at 742. The insured was shot to death by a companion. IcL The
insurance company sought to deny coverage because death resulted from an
intentional injury. IdL The court upheld coverage, claiming that exclusion "would

logically refer to the acts of the parties to the contract [namely the insured in this
case] and in the case of ambiguity in a policy of insurance as has often been said,
such uncertainty is resolved against the insurer. Id. at 743 (emphasis added).
In light of the uncertainty and ambiguity existing in this case, the trial court
was obligated to construe the exclusion in favor of coverage, even if such a
construction is not the most logical possible construction. That legal principle is
most plainly applied in the LPS Hospital case. The most logical reading of the
exclusion in that case would have led the court to exclude coverage. However,
because of the ambiguity, the court construed the exclusion in favor of coverage.
765 P.2d at 860-61.
Accordingly, the trial court erred by concluding that the exclusion plainly
and unambiguously applied to exclude coverage in this case.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
On the basis of the foregoing arguments and analysis, the Court of Appeals
should reverse the trial court and set aside the summary judgment entered in favor
of Monumental. In addition, the Court of Appeals should conclude that the
"felony" exclusion in this case is ambiguous and direct that it be construed in favor
of coverage. In the alternative, the Court of Appeals should either conclude as a
matter of law that Mr. Murdock's death was not sufficiently connected to the

commission of any assault or felony or else remand the case for trial with respect
to that issue.
DATED this \°i°^

day of July, 1999.

m.C NIELSON
JAMES K. HASLAM

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to be mailed by U.S. mail, postage
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day of July, 1999, to the following:

Joy L. Clegg
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARILYN MURDOCK,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CASE NO.

980901404

:

MONUMENTAL LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a foreign corporation doing
business in Utah,
Defendant.

:

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and defendant's cross Motion for
Summary Judgment came on for hearing on July 17,1998. Defendant's submitted courtesy
copies of cases cited in briefs on July 20,1998 and plaintiff submitted courtesy copies of
cases on July 28,1998. Now being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds that no
material issues of fact are in dispute in this case.
In April of 1996 Richard Moser and Deb Alires went to deposit the night's theatre
receipts at a Zion's Bank night drop. Zachary Murdock, the Plaintiffs husband, and an
unknown accomplice took the money Mr. Moser carried from him after pointing a hand
gun at him, threatening to shoot him, hitting him repeatedly with a stungun, tearing his
clothing, gouging his chest and kicking him to the ground. They continued hitting him
with the stungun and kicking him after he fell to the ground. After also attacking Ms.
Alires, the men ran out of the bank area. To get the money back, Mr. Moser got into a van
and pursued the two men into a field full of construction debris. The man with the money

got into a gray truck and Mr. Moser tried to block his path with the van. The robber got
away and Mr. Moser's van developed mechanical problems so he gave up the chase. Later
Mr. Moser learned he had struck and killed one of the robbers when he was driving the
van. The robber who was killed was the plaintiffs husband. He had obtained group
accidental death insurance with the defendant. Under the decedent's plan an accidental
death benefit will not be paid to the beneficiary for a loss which has been excluded from
coverage. The pertinent exclusionary language reads:
"We will not pay a benefit for a loss which is caused by, results from, or contributed
to by:
( 4 ) . . . committing an assault or felony;... "
This Court finds as a matter of law that the decedent's death arose out of his
felonious conduct because Mr. Moser's immediate chase of his attackers in flight was a
natural and probable consequence of their brutal robbery of him. Accordingly plaintiffs
husband's death was not accidental. However, for argument's sake, even if his death
(because unexpected by him) could somehow be considered to be accidental, nonetheless,
the death benefit is clearly excluded by the plain meaning of the language of the contract.
There is no ambiguity in the wording or its context. The defendant's felonious conduct is
excluded from coverage. The Court adopts defendant's arguments in support of
defendant's Motion as consistent with the Court's ruling.
The Court therefore denies plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and grants
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The defendant is to prepare an Order
consistent with the Court's ruling.

J

Dated this /_ day of August, 1998

DISTRICT

MURDOCK vs. MONUMENTAL
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MAILTNG CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum
Decision, to the following, this ^f

day of August, 1998:

G. Eric Nelson
BERTCH & BIRCH
Commerce Center, Suite 100
5296 S. Commerce Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Joy L. Clegg
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P O Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

FILED DISTftfiCT COURT
Third Judicial District

AUb 1 8 1998
SALT LAKE COUNTY

JOYL. CLEGG(A4138)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURI OF SAL1 LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MARILYN MURDOCK,

ORDER

Plaintiff;
vs.
MONUMENTAL LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a foreign coip oration doing
business in Utah,

Civil No. 980901404
Judge Sheila K. McCleve

Defendant.

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and defendant's Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment came on for hearing on July 17, 1998, with Joy L. Clegg of Snow, Christensen &
Martineau appearing as counsel for defendant, and G. Eric Nielson appearing as counsel for
plaintiff. Defendant submitted courtesy copies of cases cited in briefs on July 20, 1998, and
plaintiff submitted courtesy copies of cases on July 28, 1998. Being fiilly advised in the premises,
the Court finds that there are no material issues of fact and it is hereby

ORDERED.
1.

That plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is denied; and

2.

That defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and that judgment is

hereby granted in favor of defendant and against plaintiff, and that plaintiffs Complaint is
dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action, without costs.
DATED this

day of

^ f / - 5 / , 1998.
BY THE COURT:

V
SheihrtC McCleve
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM this
{&_ day of Q^-y*jJC^, 1998

G. Eric Nielsbn
Attorney for plaintiff
N\19186\3\ORDERSJ
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GROUP ACCIDENTAL DEATH PLAN
CERTIFICATE
OF
INSURANCE

Ne certify that, subject to the terms of the Group Policy, the Member named in the Certificate schedule (referred to as
^ou, your and yours) is insured for the benefits described in this Certificate. Your eligible Dependent, if any. for whom
Dremiums have been paid is also insured for the benefits described in this Certificate. You and your Dependent are
eferred to as the Covered Person.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF INSURANCE
The insurance takes effect at 12:01 A.M. Standard Time on the Effective Date shown on the Certificate Schedule.
n this Certificate Monumental Life Insurance Company will be called we, our or us. This Certificate summarizes certain
provisions of the Group Policy. All coverage and provisions are subject to those in the Group Policy issued to the
D
olicyholder.

THIRTY DAY RIGHT TO EXAMINE CERTIFICATE
f you are not satisfied for any reason, you may return your Certificate withir^30 days after receipt. Your premium will
>e refunded. When so returned, the Certificate is void from the beginning. Return the Certificate to us at our Home Office
)r to our authorized agent.
Dur President and Secretary witness this Certificate.

PLEASE READ YOUR ACCIDENTAL DEATH INSURANCE
CERTIFICATE CAREFULLY

e&-)
Secretary

President

MZ0800175/0562F
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NAME AND ADDRESS OF MEMBER
Zack Murdock
1852 E. 4650 S.
Salt Lake City, UT

84117 5102

FIRST SECURITY BANK CUSTOMER

CERTIFICATE NUMBER
POLICYHOLDER
894-0641332
NATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION
GROUP INSURANCE TRUST

EFFECTIVE DATE
01/15/94

PARTICIPATING INSTITUTION
POLICY NUMBER
FIRST SECURITY BANK
MZ0800175 0562F
—

SCHEDULE OF BENEFITS

—

ACCIDENTAL DEATH BENEFITS
MEMBER
UNDER AGE 65
AGE 65 THROUGH 74
AGE 75 THROUGH 79
AGE 80 THROUGH 84
AGE 85 AND OVER

$100,000.00*
$75,000.00
$50,000.00
$25,000.00
$.00

SPOUSE
90% OF MEMBER BENEFIT (100% IF
CHILDREN NOT COVERED)
CHILDREN
10% OF MEMBER BENEFIT (15% IF
SPOUSE NOT COVERED)
$50,000.00 Effective 01/15/94
$50,000.00 Effective 07/15/94

DUPLICATE

5B

0011

0\

PROVISION

PAGE NUMBER

Accidental Death Benefit

3

Changes in Coverage

3

Definitions

2,3

Exclusions

3

Exposure and Disappearance

3

General Provisions

5

Premiums

4,5

Schedule of Benefits

2

When Coverage Ends

4

When There Is, A Claim

5,6
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SCHEDULE OF BENEFITS
Insurance Benefits are determined by this schedule and the terms of the Group Policy.
ACCIDENT INSURANCE BENEFITS*
Contributory Accidental Death
An amount of insurance as selected by you from $25,000 to $150,000 in increments of $25,000.
Dependent spouse is insured for 90% of your benefit if children are covered; 100% of your benefit if
children are not covered.
Dependent children are insured for 10% of your benefit if a spouse is covered; 15% of your benefit if
spouse is not covered.
* All benefits for Covered Persons will reduce to 75% of the Amount of Insurance Benefit on the date you attain
age 65, to 50% at age 75, and to 25% at age 80; coverage terminates at your age 85.

DEFINITIONS
When used in this Certificate the following words and phrases have the meaning given. The use of any personal pronoun
includes both genders.
BENEFICIARY means the person or entity named by the insured Member, on forms and in a manner approved by us,
to receive benefits.
DEPENDENT means your spouse, unless you are legally separated; your unmarried children under age 19; or under
age 23, if enrolled as a full-time student in an accredited college, university, vocational or technical school; and children
whose support is required by a court decree.
Children include natural children, stepchildren and legally adopted children^ They must be primarily dependent on you
for support and maintenance and must live in a parent-child relationship with you.
A spouse or child who is insured under the Group Policy as a Member will not be eligible as a Dependent. If a husband
and wife are both insured as Members, a child will be the Dependent of only one.
GROUP POLICY means the contract issued to the Policyholder providing the benefits described.
INJURY means bodilv injury caused by an accident. The accident must occur while the Covered Person's insurance is
in force under the Group Policy. The Injury must be the direct cause of the Loss and must be independent of all other
causes. The Injury must not be caused by or contributed to by Sickness.
LOSS means the death of the Covered Person or any physical impairment, incurred expense, or other benefit covered
under the terms of the Group Policy and any attached Riders.
PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATION means an Ogamzat.on An«ch has signed a Participation Agreement adopting the
Policyholder's plan of insurance
POLICYHOLDER means the !ega e'M<?\ r. /^cse '-jr-,e the G'ouo Policy is issued as shown on the Schedule of
Benefits.
POLICY MONTH m e a ^ the ce „•/ ^ • •• > v.i *
month.

.

- - • • ; • ^?. :>' t^e -nontn. it enas on the last day of the same
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SICKNESS means an mness or disease wnicn resuus in a coverea 1055 wnne insurance
force under the Group Policy.

IUI

mo ^ v o i c u

I-OIOUM

15 m

CHANGES IN COVERAGE
If, after your Effective Date of Insurance, you add an eligible Dependent or request a change in benefits for a Covered
Person, the Effective Date of Insurance for the new coverage will be the beginning of the Policy Month following our
acceptance of the enrollment form or change request, subject to the payment of any additional required premium.
NEWBORN DEPENDENTS
Newborn Dependents are covered at birth, however, any required premium must be paid within 31 days from birth to
continue coverage beyond 31 days.

ACCIDENTAL DEATH BENEFIT
When we receive due proof that a Covered Person dies, we will pay the benefit shown on the Schedule of Benefits to
his named Beneficiary; provided:
(1) death occurs as a direct result of an Injury; and
(2) death occurs within 365 days of the accident causing the Injury.

EXPOSURE AND DISAPPEARANCE
If by reason of an accident covered by the Group Policy a Covered Person is unavoidably exposed to the elements and,
as a result of such exposure, suffers a covered loss and a benefit is otherwise payable, the loss will be covered by the
Group Policy.
If a Covered Person is involved in an accident which results in the sinking or wrecking of a licensed public conveyance
in which he was a passenger and his body is not located within one year of such accident, it will be presumed that the
Covered Person died as a result of an Injury.

EXCLUSIONS
We will not pay a benefit for a loss which is caused b;, results from, or contributed to by:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
{11)
(12)

suicide, attempted suicide or intentionally self-inflicted injury, while sane or insane (in Missouri while sane);
declared or undeclared war or any act of war;
full-time military service;
participating in a riot; committing an assault or felony;
Sickness or its medical or surgical treatment, including diagnosis;
bacterial infection except through a wound accidentally sustained;
operating or riding in any kind of aircraft except as a fare-paying passenger on a regularly scheduled
commercial flight;
alcohol intoxication, as defined in the state where the accident occurred;
taking of any drug, medication, narcotic or hallucinogen, unless as prescribed by a Physician;
taking of alcohol in combination with any drug, medication or sedative;
voluntary gas inhalation or poison voluntarily taken, administered or inhaled;
riding or driving as a professional in any kind of race for prize money or profit.
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WHEN COVERAGE ENDS
A Covered Person's insurance automatically ends on the first of the following dates:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

The date the Group Policy is terminated;
The premium due date you fail to pay the required premium, except as provided in the Grace Period;
The premium due date after you are no longer a member of the Participating Organization;
The premium due date next following the date the Participating Organization ceases to participate in this plan
of insurance;

(5) The premium due date next following your 85th birthdate.
Your Dependent's insurance automatically ends on the first of the following dates:
(1) The date your coverage terminates except as provided in the Continuance of Dependent Insurance Provision;
(2) The premium due date after a Covered Person ceases to be an eligible Dependent.
If an insured dependent child attains the specified age limit and proof is submitted within 31 days that the child:
(1) is not able to become gainfully employed because of mental retardation or physical handicap;
(2) became so incapable prior to the age limit; and
(3) is primarily dependent on you for support and maintenance,
then the age limit will not apply as long as the child continues to meet these conditions. The child will be insured for the
same benefits he previously had. Proof of continued disability and dependency may be required but not more often than
once a year. Such child's insurance will not continue beyond the date it would otherwise end.
CONTINUANCE OF DEPENDENT INSURANCE. If you die while insured under the Group Policy, your spouse may
continue coverage if insured. The spouse's premium will be based on his attained age. Coverage may also continue for
any Dependent Children covered at the time of your death at the applicable premium. However, if there is no spouse
upon your death, coverage for Dependent Children will end.
Termination of the Group Policy will not prejudice any claim originating prior to termination subject to all other terms of
the Group Policy.

PREMIUMS
We provide insurance coverage in return for premium payment. Premiums are payable by you. Your first premium is
due on your Effective Date. Premiums are paid to us on or before the due date. The initial premium rates are shown on
your Certificate Schedule.
PREMIUM CHANGES. We have the right to change the premium rates on any premium due date. We will provide written
notice at least 31 days before the date of change. The premium rates may also be changed at any time the terms of the
Group Policy are changed.
Premiums may be paid monthly, quarterly, semi-annually, or annually. The premium mode may be changed by sending
us a written request. Upon our approval, the change will be made.
GRACE PERIOD. You have a 31 day grace period for the payment of each premium due aftar the first premium.
Coverage will continue in force during the grace period. It will terminate at the end of the grace period if all premiums
which are due are not paid. We will require payment of all premiums for the period this coverage continues in force
including the premiums for the grace period.
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n c i r o o i M i c r v i t m u r I N O U M A N O E if AS terminate insurance for nonDavment cf premium vou may reinstate
coverage within 90 days follown
* last jnpaid oremiun due date You must f
all overdue oremiums The reinstated
policy will not cover a loss <vh.ch jccjrrea du »^q f h ^ JDS9 eerier
UNPAID PREMIUM i V h ^ a :iai^ * oa c tor e<oen, „ - „
may bo deducted from t r s :>a n ^a* rant

e - .ur n j n - 3race Period any premium due and unpaid

GENERAL PROVISIONS
BENEFICIARY CHANGES You may name an/person *o be ,ou r Beneficiary at the time of enrollment You may change
your Beneficiary at any time When we receive and record the change request it will take effect as of the date you signed
it If you die prior to the date we receive and record the change any payment we make to the new Beneficiary will be
valid The prior Beneficiary's interest ends the date the new designation takes effect
If more than one Beneficiary is named without stating their respective interests, they will share equally If a Beneficiary
dies before you, that interest ends The Beneficiaries that survive will share equally unless you make a written request
to the contrary
You are your Dependent's Beneficiary If you die before your Dependent, any benefit for the Dependent will be paid to
the first surviving class of the following The Dependent's spouse, children, parents, brothers and sisters, executors or
administrators.
INCONTESTABILITY. No statement made by you can be used in a contest after your insurance has been in force two
years during your lifetime No statement you make can be used in a contest unless it is in writing and signed by you
MISSTATEMENT OF AGE. If the age of a Covered Person has been misstated in the enrollment form for insurance
under the Group Policy, the benefits payable will be those which the premiums paid would have purchased based upon
his correct age, otherwise, there will be an equitable adjustment of premiums
OPTIONAL SETTLEMENT METHODS. You, or the Beneficiary after the Covered Person's death, may elect to have
loss of life benefits paid in installments Such election must be sent to us in writing. The amounts and terms of the
installments will be those which we offer at the time of election
OTHER INSURANCE IN THIS COMPANY. The Covered Person may only have an aggregate of $1,000,000 of
accidental death insurance in force with us or any other AEGON, U S A., Inc affiliate at one time If we determine that
accidental death insurance is in force in excess of this amount, the Covered Person must choose which coverage he
wants to remain active All other insurance will be terminated All premiums paid for canceled certificates or policies will
be returned to you.
RIGHT TO EXAMINE. The Policy is in the possession of the Policyholder, it will be available to be inspected by you at
any time during business hours at his office
WHEN THERE IS A CLAIM
NOTICE OF CLAIM. We must be given written notice of claim within 20 days after a covered loss occurs If notice cannot
be given within that time, it must be given as soon as reasonably possible
The notice trust contain the Covered Person's name and enoi qh information to identify him Notice may be mailed to
our Home Office or to our agent
CLAIM FORMS. When we receive notice of claim, the Covered Person will be sent forms to file proof of loss If the
forms are not sent within 15 days after we receive notice then the Covered Person will meet the proof of loss
requirements by giving us a written statement of the nature and extent of the loss This must be sent to us within the
time limit stated in the Proof of Loss provision
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PROOF OF LOSS. Written proof must be sent to us within 90 days after the date the loss occurs. If it was not reasonably
possible to give us written proof within 90 days, we will nof reduce or deny a claim for this reason, if it is shown that
written proof of the loss was given as soon as reasonably possible.
PAYMENT OF CLAIMS. Claims for benefits provided by the Group Policy will be paid as soon as written proof is received.
Benefits for loss of life will be paid in accordance with the Beneficiary designation in effect at the time of payment. All
other benefits are paid directly to the Covered Person, unless otherwise directed. If a benefit is unpaid at his death or
if we feel he is not able to give a valid receipt for payment, we may pay an amount up to $1,000 to any relative by blood
or marriage who we deem to be equitably entitled.
If a Beneficiary is a minor and there is no parent or legal guardian, or if he cannot give a valid release, the benefit will
be paid as follows: to the person or institution we decide has assumed custody or support of the Beneficiary.
Any payment that we make in good faith will fully discharge us to the extent of that payment.
RIGHT OF RECOVERY. If payments for claims exceed the maximum amount payable under any benefit provisions or
riders of the Group Policy, we have the right to recover the excess of such payments.
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION AND AUTOPSY. At our experse, we have the right to have the Covered Person examined
as often as necessary while a claim is pending. At our expense, we may require an autopsy unless the law forbids it.
LEGAL ACTIONS. No legal action may be brought to recover against the Group Policy within 60 days after written proof
of loss has been given. No such action will be brought after three years from the time written proof of loss is required
to be given.
If a time limit of the Group Policy is less than allowed by the laws of the state where the Covered Person lives, the limit
is extended to meet the minimum time allowed by such law.
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Ttfon/mentaL
^HflEa INSURANCE
l l l C COMPANY
(referred to as we, us, our)

CERTIFICATE OF INSURANCE
Subject to the terms of Policy No. MZ 0800175/056IF, issued to:

TRUSTEES OF THE NATIONAL FINANCIAL
INSTITUTION GROUP INSURANCE TRUST
c/o First Security Bank

£
! |

(the Policyholder)

We certify that, subject to the terms of the Group Policy, the Member to whom this Certificate is issued (referred to as you, your
and yours) is insured for the benefits described in this Certificate on and following the effective date on which he is eligible.
In this Certificate Monumental Life Insurance Company will be called we, our or us. This Certificate summarizes certain provisions
of the Group Policy. All coverage and provisions are subject to those in the Group Policy issued to the Policyholder.
SCHEDULE OF BENEFITS
Benefit

Your Age at Death

$1,000.00
$ 750.00
$ 500.00
$ 250.00

Under Age 65
Age 65 but less than age 75
Age 75 but less than age 80
Age 80 but less than age 85

*Benefits terminate on the premium due date following the date you attain age 85.
DEFINITIONS
When used in this Certificate the following words and phrases ru vc the meaning given. The use of an> personal pronoun includes
both genders.
INJURY means bodily injury caused by an accident. The accident must occur while your insurance is in force under the Group
Policy. The Injury must be the direct cause of loss and must be independent of all other causes. The Injury must not be caused by
or contributed to by Sickness.
PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATION means an Organization which has signed a Participation Agreement adopting the
Policyholder's plan of insurance.
SICKNESS means an illness or disease which results in a covered loss while insurance for the Covered Person is in force under
the Policy.

ACCIDENTAL DEATH BENEFIT
When we receive due proof that you die, we will pay the benefit shown on the Schedule of Benefits to your named Beneficiary,
provided:
(1)
(2)

death occurs as a direct result of an Injury; and
death occurs within 365 days of the accident causing the Injury.

AD2000GCM

M20800175/056 IF

EXCLUSIONS
We will not pay a benefit for a loss which is cmsed by, results from, or contributed to by
(1)
suicide, attempted suicide or intentionally self-inflicted injury, while sane or insane (in Missouri while sane),
(2)
declared or undeclared war or any act of war,
(3)
full-time military service;
(4)
participating in a riot; committing an assault or felony;
(5)
Sickness or its medical or surgical treatment, including diagnosis;
(6)
bacterial infection except through a wound accidentally sustained;
(7)
operating or riding in any kind of aircraft except as a fare-paying passenger on a regularly scheduled commercial flight,
(8)
alcohol intoxication;
(9)
taking of any drug, medication, narcotic or hallucinogen, unless as prescribed by a Physician;
(10)
taking of alcohol in combination with any drug, medication or sedative;
(11)
voluntary gas inhalation or poisonj/oluntarily taken, administered or inhaled,
(12) riding or driving as a professional in any kind of race for prize money or profit.
WHEN COVERAGE ENDS
Your insurance automatically ends on the first of the following dates:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

The date the Group Policy is terminated;
The premium due date following the termination of your account with the Participating Organization;
The premium due date next following the date the Participating Organization ceases to participate in this plan;
The premium due date next following your 85th birthdate or your 5th anniversary, whichever occurs first.

Termination of the Group Policy will not prejudice any claim originating prior to termination subject to all other terms of the Group
Policy.
GENERAL PROVISIONS
BENEFICIARY. Your Beneficiary shall be as specified on the records of the Administrator.
RIGHT TO EXAMINE. The Policy is in the possession of the Policyholder; it will be available to be inspected by you at any time
during business hours.
WHEN THERE IS A CLAIM
NOTICE OF CLAIM. Claims for benefits provided by the Group Policy will be ^aid as soon as written proof is received. Benefits
for loss of life will be paid in accordance with the Beneficiary designation in effect at the time of payment. All other benefits are
paid directly to you.
If a Beneficiary is a minor and there is no parent or legal guardian, or if he cannot give a valid release, the benefit will be paid as
follows: to the person or institution we decide has assumed custody or support of the Beneficiary.
Any payment that we make in good faith will fully discharge us to the extent of that payment.
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION AND AUTOPSY. At our expense, we have the right to have you examined as often as necessary
while a claim is pending. At our expense, we may require an autopsy unless the law forbids it.
LEGAL ACTIONS, No legal action may be brought to recover against the Group Policy within 60 days after written proof of loss
has been given. No such action will be brought after three years from the time written proof of loss is required to be given.
If a time limit of the Group Policy is less than allowed by the laws of the state where the Covered Person lives, the limit is extended
to meet the minimum time allowed by such law.
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